Rescuing Dod from Too Much of a Good Thing

Shortly after Hurricane Katrina smashed the Southern United States, President Bush ignited a national debate over the role of federal troops in domestic disaster response. This paper is of interest to those military leaders whose opinion Congress will solicit as it contemplates changing the military's role in domestic disaster response. Before answering three questions the President posed questioning the military's role in future disaster responses, this paper evaluates the military response to Katrina by accounting for the scope of the disaster and underscoring past military contributions to the Gulf Coast national response effort. Disasters like Hurricane Katrina are unique. Hurricane Katrina was a catastrophic disaster. Devastation on this grand a scale required federal disaster assistance to support an overwhelmed local disaster response system. In accordance with the National Response Plan, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) accepted resource contributions from many federal agencies to help mitigate the disaster. In response to the disaster, DoD rushed to deploy operational, support, and planning elements to provide an immediate on-scene disaster response capability. Individual military commanders used initiative to alleviate civilian suffering, often having to negotiate with unfamiliar agencies or circumvent response procedures they did not fully understand in the first place. Apparently, local officials deemed the federal response too slow. However, based their perceptions of rapid, organized, military-response to Katrina, many citizens began calling for an increased role for the military in disaster response. Some even suggested granting a new role or greater authority for DoD in an effort to increase the military's contribution to the relief effort. New roles should not be the issue in the ongoing debate. Debate ought to discover ways to increase the military's participation in future disasters. Ultimately, the military needs no new authority t